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 Status of This Memo
 
    This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
    not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
    memo is unlimited.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
 
 Abstract
 
    A mobile node needs at least the following information: a home
    address, a home agent address, and a security association with home
    agent to register with the home agent.  The process of obtaining this
    information is called bootstrapping.  This document discusses issues
    involved with how the mobile node can be bootstrapped for Mobile IPv6
    (MIPv6) and various potential deployment scenarios for mobile node
    bootstrapping.
 
 Table of Contents
 
    1. Introduction ....................................................2
       1.1. Overview of the Problem ....................................3
       1.2. Bootstrapping ..............................................3
       1.3. Terminology ................................................4
    2. Assumptions .....................................................5
    3. Design Goals ....................................................6
    4. Non-goals .......................................................7
    5. Motivation for bootstrapping ....................................7
       5.1. Addressing .................................................7
            5.1.1. Dynamic Home Address Assignment .....................7
            5.1.2. Dynamic Home Agent Assignment .......................9
            5.1.3. "Opportunistic" or "Local" Discovery ................9
            5.1.4. Management Requirements .............................9
       5.2. Security Infrastructure ...................................10
            5.2.1. Integration with AAA Infrastructure ................10
       5.3. Topology Change ...........................................10
 
 
 
 Patel & Giaretta             Informational                      [Page 1] 
 RFC 4640              PS Bootstrapping Mobile IPv6        September 2006
 
 
            5.3.1. Dormant Mode Mobile Nodes ..........................10
    6. Network Access and Mobility Services ...........................11
    7. Deployment Scenarios ...........................................13
       7.1. Mobility Service Subscription Scenario ....................13
       7.2. Integrated ASP Network Scenario ...........................14
       7.3. Third-Party MSP Scenario ..................................14
       7.4. Infrastructure-less Scenario ..............................15
    8. Parameters for Authentication ..................................15
    9. Security Considerations ........................................17
       9.1. Security Requirements of Mobile IPv6 ......................17
       9.2. Threats to the Bootstrapping Process ......................18
    10. Contributors ..................................................19
    11. Acknowledgements ..............................................20
    12. Informative References ........................................20
 
 1.  Introduction
 
    Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] specifies mobility support based on the
    assumption that a mobile node (MN) has a trust relationship with an
    entity called the home agent.  Once the home agent address has been
    learned (for example, via manual configuration, anycast discovery
    mechanisms, or DNS lookup), Mobile IPv6 signaling messages between
    the mobile node and the home agent are secured with IPsec or with the
    authentication protocol, as defined in [RFC4285].  The requirements
    for this security architecture are created with [RFC3775], and the
    details of this procedure are described in [RFC3776].
 
    In [RFC3775], there is an implicit requirement that the MN be
    provisioned with enough information that will permit it to register
    successfully with its home agent.  However, having this information
    statically provisioned creates practical deployment issues.
 
    This document serves to define the problem of bootstrapping.
    Bootstrapping is defined as the process of obtaining enough
    information at the mobile node that it can successfully register with
    an appropriate home agent.
 
    The requirements for bootstrapping could consider various
    scenarios/network deployment issues.  It is the basic assumption of
    this document that certain minimal parameters (seed information) are
    available to the mobile node to aid in bootstrapping.  The exact seed
    information available differs depending on the deployment scenario.
    This document describes various deployment scenarios and provides a
    set of minimal parameters that are available in each deployment
    scenario.
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    This document stops short of suggesting the preferred solutions for
    how the mobile node should obtain information.  Such details will be
    available from separate documents.
 
 1.1.  Overview of the Problem
 
    Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] expects the mobile node to have a static home
    address, a home agent address (which can be derived from an anycast
    address), and a security association with a home agent (or multiple
    home agents).
 
    This static provisioning of information has various problems, as
    discussed in Section 5.
 
    The aim of this document is:
 
    o  To define bootstrapping;
 
    o  To identify sample deployment scenarios where Mobile Internet
       Protocol version 6 (MIPv6) will be deployed, taking into account
       the relationship between the subscriber and the service provider;
       and
 
    o  To identify the minimal set of information required on the Mobile
       Node and in the network in order for the mobile node to obtain
       address and security credentials, to register with the home agent.
 
 1.2.  Bootstrapping
 
    Bootstrapping is defined as obtaining enough information at the
    mobile node that the mobile node can successfully register with an
    appropriate home agent.  Specifically, this means obtaining the home
    agent address and home address, and for the mobile node and home
    agent to authenticate and mutually construct security credentials for
    Mobile IPv6.
 
    Typically, bootstrapping happens when a mobile node does not have all
    the information it needs to set up the Mobile IPv6 service.  This
    includes, but is not limited to, situations in which the mobile node
    does not having any information when it boots up for the first time
    (out of the box), or does not retain any information during reboots.
 
    Also, in certain scenarios, after the MN bootstraps for the first
    time (out of the box), the need for subsequent bootstrapping is
    implementation dependent.  For instance, the MN may bootstrap every
    time it boots, bootstrap every time on prefix change, or bootstrap
    periodically to anchor to an optimal HA (based on distance, load,
    etc.).
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 1.3.  Terminology
 
    General mobility terminology can be found in [RFC3753].  The
    following additional terms are used here:
 
    Trust relationship
 
       In the context of this document, trust relationship means that the
       two parties in question, typically the user of the mobile host and
       the mobility or access service authorizer, have some sort of prior
       contact in which the mobile node was provisioned with credentials.
       These credentials allow the mobile node to authenticate itself to
       the mobility or access service provider and to prove its
       authorization to obtain service.
 
    Infrastructureless relationship
 
       In the context of this document, an infrastructureless
       relationship is one in which the user of the mobile node and the
       mobility or access service provider have no previous contact and
       the mobile node is not required to supply credentials to
       authenticate and prove authorization for service.  Mobility and/or
       network access service is provided without any authentication or
       authorization.  Infrastructureless in this context does not mean
       that there is no network infrastructure, such as would be the case
       for an ad hoc network.
 
    Credentials
 
       Data used by a mobile node to authenticate itself to a mobility or
       access network service authorizer and to prove authorization to
       receive service.  User name/passwords, one time password cards,
       public/private key pairs with certificates, and biometric
       information are some examples.
 
    ASA
 
       Access Service Authorizer.  A network operator that authenticates
       a mobile node and establishes the mobile node’s authorization to
       receive Internet service.
 
    ASP
 
       Access Service Provider.  A network operator that provides direct
       IP packet forwarding to and from the end host.
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    Serving Network Access Provider
 
       A network operator that is the mobile node’s ASP but not its ASA.
       The serving network access provider may or may not additionally
       provide mobility service.
 
    Home Network Access Provider
 
       A network operator that is both the mobile node’s ASP and ASA.
       The home network access provider may or may not additionally
       provide mobility service (note that this is a slightly different
       definition from that in RFC 3775).
 
    IASP
 
       Integrated Access Service Provider.  A service provider that
       provides both authorization for network access and mobility
       service.
 
    MSA
 
       Mobility Service Authorizer.  A service provider that authorizes
       Mobile IPv6 service.
 
    MSP
 
       Mobility Service Provider.  A service provider that provides
       Mobile IPv6 service.  In order to obtain such service, the mobile
       node must be authenticated and prove authorization to obtain the
       service.
    Home Mobility Service Provider
 
       A MSP that both provides mobility service and authorizes it.
 
    Serving Mobility Service Provider
 
       A MSP that provides mobility service but depends on another
       service provider to authorize it.
 
 2.  Assumptions
 
    o  A basic assumption in Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] is that there is a
       trust relationship between the mobile node and its home agent(s).
       This trust relationship can be direct, or indirect through, for
       instance, an ASP that has a contract with the MSP.  This trust
       relationship can be used to bootstrap the MN.
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       One typical way of verifying the trust relationship is using
       authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA)
       infrastructure.  In this document, two distinct uses of AAA are
       considered:
 
       AAA for Network Access
 
          This functionality provides authentication and authorization to
          access the network (obtain address and send/receive packets).
 
       AAA for Mobility Service
 
          This functionality provides authentication and authorization
          for mobility services.
 
       These functionalities may be implemented in a single entity or in
       different entities, depending on the service models described in
       Section 6 or deployment scenarios as described in Section 7.
 
    o  Some identifier, such as an Network Access Identifier (NAI), as
       defined in [RFC4283] or [RFC2794], is provisioned on the MN that
       permits the MN to identify itself to the ASP and MSP.
 
 3.  Design Goals
 
    A solution to the bootstrapping problem has the following design
    goals:
 
    o  The following information must be available at the end of
       bootstrapping, to enable the MN to register with the HA.
 
       *  MN’s home agent address
 
       *  MN’s home address
 
       *  IPsec Security Association (SA) between MN and HA, Intenet Key
          Exchange Protocol (IKE) pre-shared secret between MN and HA
 
    o  The bootstrapping procedure can be triggered at any time, either
       by the MN or by the network.  Bootstrapping can occur, for
       instance, due to administrative action, information going stale,
       or HA indicating the MN.  Bootstrapping may be initiated even when
       the MN is registered with the HA and has all the required
       credentials.  This may typically happen to refresh/renew the
       credentials.
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    o  Subsequent protocol interaction (for example, updating the IPsec
       SA) can be executed between the MN and the HA itself without
       involving the infrastructure that was used during bootstrapping.
 
    o  Solutions to the bootstrapping problem should enable storage of
       user-specific information on entities other than the home agent.
 
    o  Solutions to the bootstrapping problem should not exclude storage
       of user-specific information on entities other than the home
       agent.
 
    o  Configuration information which is exchanged between the mobile
       node and the home agent must be secured using integrity and replay
       protection.  Confidentiality protection should be provided if
       necessary.
 
    o  The solution should be applicable to all feasible deployment
       scenarios that can be envisaged, along with the relevant
       authentication/authorization models.
 
 4.  Non-goals
 
    This following issues are clearly outside the scope of bootstrapping:
 
    o  Home prefix renumbering is not explicitly supported as part of
       bootstrapping.  If the MN executes the bootstrap procedures every
       time it powers on (as opposed to caching state information from
       previous bootstrap process), then home network renumbering is
       taken care of automatically.
 
    o  Bootstrapping in the absence of a trust relationship between MN
       and any provider is not considered.
 
 5.  Motivation for bootstrapping
 
 5.1.  Addressing
 
    The default bootstrapping described in the Mobile IPv6 base
    specification [RFC3775] has a tight binding to the home addresses and
    home agent addresses.
 
    In this section, we discuss the problems caused by the currently
    tight binding to home addresses and home agent addresses.
 
 5.1.1.  Dynamic Home Address Assignment
 
    Currently, the home agent uses the mobile node’s home address for
    authorization.  When manual keying is used, this happens through the
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    security policy database, which specifies that a certain security
    association may only be used for a specific home address.  When
    dynamic keying is used, the home agent ensures that the IKE Phase 1
    identity is authorized to request security associations for the given
    home address.  Mobile IPv6 uses IKEv1, which is unable to update the
    security policy database according to a dynamically assigned home
    address.  As a result, static home address assignment is really the
    only home address configuration technique compatible with the base
    specification.
 
    However, support for dynamic home address assignment would be
    desirable for the following reasons:
 
    Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)-based address assignment.
    Some providers may want to use DHCPv6 or other dynamic address
    assignment (e.g., IKEv2) from the home network to configure home
    addresses.
 
    Recovery from a duplicate address collision.  It may be necessary to
    recover from a collision of addresses on the home network by one of
    the mobile nodes changing its home address.
 
    Addressing privacy.  It may be desirable to establish randomly
    generated addresses as in [RFC3041] and use them for a short period
    of time.  Unfortunately, current protocols make it possible to use
    such addresses only from the visited network.  As a result, these
    addresses cannot be used for communications lasting longer than the
    attachment to a particular visited network.
 
    Ease of deployment.  In order to simplify the deployment of Mobile
    IPv6, it is desirable to free users and administrators from the task
    of allocating home addresses and specifying them in the security
    policy database.  This is consistent with the general IPv6 design
    goal of using autoconfiguration wherever possible.
 
    Prefix changes in the home network.  The Mobile IPv6 specification
    contains support for a mobile node to autoconfigure a home address as
    based on its discovery of prefix information on the home subnet
    [RFC3775].  Autoconfiguration in case of network renumbering is done
    by replacing the existing network prefix with the new network prefix.
 
    Subsequently, the MN needs to update the mobility binding in the HA
    to register the newly configured Home Address.  However, the MN may
    not be able to register the newly configured address with the HA if a
    security association related to that reconfigured Home Address does
    not exist in the MN and the HA.  This situation is not handled in the
    current MIPv6 specification [RFC3775].
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 5.1.2.  Dynamic Home Agent Assignment
 
    Currently, the address of the home agent is specified in the security
    policy database.  Support for multiple home agents requires the
    configuration of multiple security policy database entries.
 
    However, support for dynamic home agent assignment would be desirable
    for the following reasons:
 
    Home agent discovery.  The Mobile IPv6 specification contains support
    for a mobile node to autoconfigure a home agent address as based on a
    discovery protocol [RFC3775].
 
    Independent network management.  An MSP may want to assign home
    agents dynamically in different subnets; for instance, not require
    that a roaming mobile node have a fixed home subnet.
 
    Local home agents.  The mobile node’s MSP may want to allow the
    serving MSP to assign a local home agent for the mobile node.  This
    is useful from the point of view of communications efficiency and has
    also been mentioned as one approach to support location privacy.
 
    Ease of deployment.  In order to simplify the deployment of Mobile
    IPv6, it is desirable to free users and administrators from the task
    of allocating home agent addresses in a static manner.  Moreover, an
    MSP may want to have a dynamic home agent assignment mechanism to
    load balance users among home agents located on different links.
 
 5.1.3.  "Opportunistic" or "Local" Discovery
 
    The home agent discovery protocol does not support an "opportunistic"
    or local discovery mechanisms in an ASP’s local access network.  It
    is expected that the mobile node must know the prefix of the home
    subnet in order to be able to discover a home agent.  It must either
    obtain that information through prefix update or have it statically
    configured.  A more typical pattern for inter-domain service
    discovery in the Internet is that the client (mobile node in this
    case) knows the domain name of the service and uses DNS to find the
    server in the visited domain.  For local service discovery, DHCP is
    typically used.
 
 5.1.4.  Management Requirements
 
    As described earlier, new addresses invalidate configured security
    policy databases and authorization tables.  Regardless of the
    specific protocols used, there is a need for either an automatic
    system for updating the security policy entries or manual
    configuration.  These requirements apply to both home agents and
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    mobile nodes, but it cannot be expected that mobile node users are
    capable of performing the required tasks.
 
 5.2.  Security Infrastructure
 
 5.2.1.  Integration with AAA Infrastructure
 
    The current IKEv1-based dynamic key exchange protocol, described in
    [RFC3776], has no integration with backend authentication,
    authorization, and accounting techniques unless the authentication
    credentials and trust relationships use certificates or pre-shared
    secrets.
 
    Certificates are not easily supported by traditional AAA
    infrastructures.  Where a traditional AAA infrastructure is used, the
    home agent is not able to leverage authentication and authorization
    information established between the mobile node, the foreign AAA
    server, and the home AAA server.  This would be desirable when the
    mobile node gains access to the foreign network, in order to
    authenticate the mobile node’s identity and determine whether the
    mobile node is authorized for mobility service.
 
    The lack of connection to the AAA infrastructure also means that the
    home agent does not know where to send accounting records at
    appropriate times during the mobile node’s session, as determined by
    the business relationship between the MSP and the mobile node’s
    owner.
 
    Presumably, some backend AAA protocol between the home agent and home
    AAA could be utilized, but IKEv1 does not contain support for
    exchanging full AAA credentials with the mobile node.  It is
    worthwhile to note that IKEv2 provides this feature.
 
 5.3.  Topology Change
 
 5.3.1.  Dormant Mode Mobile Nodes
 
    The description of the protocol to push prefix information to mobile
    nodes in Section 10.6 of [RFC3775] has an implicit assumption that
    the mobile node is active and taking IP traffic.  In fact, many, if
    not most, mobile devices will be in a low power "dormant mode" to
    save battery power, or will even be switched off, so they will miss
    any propagation of prefix information.  As a practical matter, if
    this protocol is used, an MSP will need to keep the old prefix around
    and handle any queries to the old home agent anycast address on the
    old subnet, whereby the mobile node asks for a new home agent as
    described in Section 11.4, until all mobile nodes are accounted for.
    Even then, since some mobile nodes are likely to be turned off for
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    long periods, some owners would need to be contacted by other means,
    reducing the utility of the protocol.
 
    Bootstrapping does not explicitly try to solve this problem of home
    network renumbering when MN is in dormant mode.  If the MN can
    configure itself after it ’comes back on’ by reinitiating the
    bootstrapping process, then network renumbering problem is fixed as a
    side effect.
 
 6.  Network Access and Mobility Services
 
    This section defines some terms as they pertain to authentication and
    practical network deployment/roaming scenarios.  This description
    lays the groundwork for Section 7.  The focus is on the ’service’
    model since, ultimately, it is the provider providing the service
    that wants to authenticate the mobile (and vice versa for mutual
    authentication between provider and the user of the service).
 
    Network access service enables a host to send and receive IP packets
    on the Internet or an intranet.  IP address configuration and IP
    packet forwarding capabilities are required to deliver this service.
    A network operator providing this service is called an access service
    provider (ASP).  An ASP can, for example, be a commercial ASP, the IT
    department of an enterprise network, or the maintainer of a home
    (residential) network.
 
    If the mobile node is not directly usable for communication at the
    current location of the MN in which network access service is
    provided by its home ASP, the mobile node is roaming.  In this case,
    the home ASP acts as the access service authorizer, but the actual
    network access is provided by the serving network access provider.
    During the authentication and authorization prior to the mobile nodes
    having Internet access, the serving network access provider may
    simply act as a routing agent for authentication and authorization
    back to the access service authorizer, or it may require an
    additional authentication and authorization step itself.  An example
    of a roaming situation is when a business person is using a hotspot
    service in an airport and the hotspot service provider has a roaming
    agreement with the business person’s cellular provider.  In that
    case, the hotspot network is acting as the serving network access
    provider, and the cellular network is acting as the access service
    authorizer.  When the business person moves from the hotspot network
    to the cellular network, the cellular network is both the home access
    service provider and the access service authorizer.
 
    Mobility service using Mobile IPv6 is conceptually and possibly also
    in practice separate from network access service, though of course
    network access is required prior to providing mobility.  Mobile IPv6
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    service enables an IPv6 host to maintain its reachability despite
    changing its network attachment point (subnets).  A network operator
    providing Mobile IPv6 service is called a mobility service provider
    (MSP).  Granting Mobile IPv6 service requires that a host
    authenticate and prove authorization for the service.  A network
    operator that authenticates a mobile node and authorizes mobility
    service is called a mobility service authorizer (MSA).  If both types
    of operation are performed by the same operator, that operator is
    called a home mobility service provider.  If authentication and
    authorization is provided by one operator and the actual service is
    provided by another, the operator providing the service is called the
    serving mobility service provider.  The serving MSP must contact the
    mobile node’s mobility service authorizer to check the mobile node’s
    authorization prior to granting mobility service.
 
    The service model defined here clearly separates the entity providing
    the service from the entity that authenticates and authorizes the
    service.  In the case of basic network access, this supports the
    traditional and well-known roaming model, in which inter-operator
    roaming agreements allow a host to obtain network access in areas
    where their home network access provider does not have coverage.  In
    the case of mobility service, this allows a roaming mobile node to
    obtain mobility service in the local operator’s network while having
    that service authorized by the home operator.  The service model also
    allows mobility service and network access service to be provided by
    different entities.  This allows a network operator with no wireless
    access, such as, for example, an enterprise network operator, to
    deploy a Mobile IPv6 home agent for mobility service while the actual
    wireless network access is provided by the serving network access
    providers with which the enterprise operator has a contract.  Here
    are some other possible combinations of ASPs and MSPs:
 
    o  The serving ASP might be the home ASP.  Similarly, the serving MSP
       might be the home MSP.
 
    o  The home ASP and the home MSP may be the same operator, or not.
       When they are the same, the same set of credentials may be used
       for both services.
 
    o  The serving ASP and the serving MSP may be the same operator, or
       not.
 
    o  It is possible that serving ASP and home MSP are the same
       operator.
 
    Similarly the home ASP and serving MSP may be the same.  Also, the
    ASA and MSA may be the same.
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    These entities and all combinations that are reasonable from a
    deployment perspective must be taken into consideration to solve the
    Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping problem.  They impact home agent discovery,
    home address configuration, and mobile node-to-home agent
    authentication aspects.
 
 7.  Deployment Scenarios
 
    This section describes the various network deployment scenarios.  The
    various combinations of service providers described in Section 6 are
    considered.
 
    For each scenario, the underlying assumptions are described.  The
    basic assumption is that there is a trust relationship between mobile
    user and the MSA.  Typically, this trust relationship is between the
    mobile user and AAA in the MSA’s network.  Seed information needed to
    bootstrap the mobile node is considered in two cases:
 
    o  AAA authentication is mandatory for network access.
 
    o  AAA authentication is not part of network access.
 
    The seed information is described further in Section 8.
 
 7.1.  Mobility Service Subscription Scenario
 
    Many commercial deployments are based on the assumption that mobile
    nodes have a subscription with a service provider.  In this scenario
    the MN has a subscription with an MSA, also called the home MSP, for
    Mobile IPv6 service.  As stated in Section 6, the MSP is responsible
    for setting up a home agent on a subnet that acts as a Mobile IPv6
    home link.  As a consequence, the home MSP should explicitly
    authorize and control the whole bootstrapping procedure.
 
    Since the MN is assumed to have a pre-established trust relationship
    with its home provider, it must be configured with an identity and
    credentials; for instance, an NAI and a shared secret by some out-
    of-band means (i.e., manual configuration) before bootstrapping.
 
    In order to guarantee ubiquitous service, the MN should be able to
    bootstrap MIPv6 operations with its home MSP from any possible access
    location, such as an open network or a network managed by an ASP,
    that may be different from the MSP and that may not have any pre-
    established trust relationship with it.
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 7.2.  Integrated ASP Network Scenario
 
    In this scenario, the ASA and MSA are the same entity.  The MN has
    security credentials for access to the network, and these credentials
    can also be used to bootstrap MIPv6.
 
    Figure 1 describes an AAA design example for integrated ASP scenario.
 
                      +----------------------------+
                      | IASP(ASA+MSA)              |
         +----+    +-----+         +----+          |
         | MN |--- | NAS |         | HA |          |
         +----+    +-----+         +----+          |
                      | \            \             |
                      |  \ +------+   \ +-------+  |
                      |   -|AAA-NA|    -|AAA-MIP|  |
                      |    +------+     +-------+  |
                      +----------------------------+
 
              NAS: Network Access Server
              AAA-NA: AAA for network access
              AAA-MIP: AAA for Mobile IP service
 
            Figure 1.  Integrated ASP network
 
 7.3.  Third-Party MSP Scenario
 
    Mobility service has traditionally been provided by the same entity
    that authenticates and authorizes the subscriber for network access.
    This is certainly the only model supported by the base Mobile IPv6
    specification.
 
    In the third-party mobility service provider scenario, the
    subscription for mobility service is made with one entity (the MSA,
    is for instance, a corporate), but the actual mobility service is
    provided by yet another entity (such as an operator specializing in
    this service, the serving MSP).  These two entities have a trust
    relationship.  Transitive trust among the mobile node and these two
    entities may be used to assure the participants that they are dealing
    with trustworthy peers.
 
    This arrangement is similar to the visited - home operator roaming
    arrangement for network access.
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    Figure 2 describes an example of a network for the third-party MSP
    scenario.
 
                 +--------------+   +--------+
                 |              |   |Serving |
                 | ASP          |   | MSP    |
    +----+    +-----+           |   | +----+ |
    | MN |--- | NAS |           |   | | HA | |  +-------------------+
    +----+    +-----+           |===| +----+ |  | MSA               |
                 | \            |   |    \   || (e.g., corporate NW)|
                 |  \ +------+  |   |     \     | +-------+         |
                 |   -|AAA-NA|  |   |      -------|AAA-MIP|         |
                 |    +------+  |   |        |  | +-------+         |
                 +------------  +   +--------+  +-------------------+
 
            Figure 2.  Third-Party MSP network
 
 7.4.  Infrastructure-less Scenario
 
    Infrastructure refers to network entities like AAA, Public-Key
    Infrastructure (PKI), and Home Location Register (HLR).
    "Infrastructure-less" implies that there is no dependency on any
    elements in the network with which the user has any form of trust
    relationship.
 
    In such a scenario, there is absolutely no relationship between host
    and infrastructure.
 
    A good example of infrastructure-less environment for MIPv6
    bootstrapping is the IETF network at IETF meetings.  It is possible
    that there could be MIP6 service available on this network (i.e., a
    MIPv6 HA).  However, there is not really any AAA infrastructure or,
    for that matter, any trust relationship that a user attending the
    meeting has with any entity in the network.
 
    This specific scenario is not supported in this document.  The reason
    for this is described in Section 9.
 
 8.  Parameters for Authentication
 
    The following is a list of parameters that are used as the seed for
    the bootstrapping procedure.  The parameters vary depending on
    whether authentication for network access is independent of
    authentication for mobility services.  If different client identities
    are used for network access and mobility services, authentication for
    network access is independent of authentication for mobility
    services.
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    o  Parameter Set 1
 
       In this case, authentication for network access is independent of
       authentication for mobility services.
 
       If the home agent address is not known to the mobile node, the
       following parameter is needed for discovering the home agent
       address:
 
       *  The domain name or Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the
          home agent
 
       This parameter may be derived in various ways, such as (but not
       limited to) static configuration, use of the domain name from the
       network access NAI (even if AAA for network access is not
       otherwise used), or use of the domain name of the serving ASP,
       where the domain name may be obtained via DHCP in the serving ASP.
 
       If the home agent address is not known but the home subnet prefix
       is known, Dynamic Home Agent Address Discovery of Mobile IPv6 may
       be used for discovering the home agent address, and the above
       parameter may not be used.
 
       When the home agent address is known to the mobile node, the
       following parameter is needed for performing mutual authentication
       between the mobile node and the home agent by using IKE:
 
       *  IKE credentials (*)
 
       In the case where the home agent does not have the entire set of
       IKE credentials, the home agent may communicate with another
       entity (for example, an AAA server) to perform mutual
       authentication in IKE.  In such a case, the IKE credentials
       include the credentials used between the mobile node and the other
       entity.  In the case where an AAA protocol is used for the
       communication between the home agent and the other entity during
       the IKE procedure, AAA for Mobile IPv6 service may be involved in
       IKE.  If the authentication protocol [RFC4285] is used, the shared
       key-based security association with the home agent is needed.
 
    o  Parameter Set 2
 
       In this case, some dependency exists between authentication for
       network access and authentication for mobility services in that a
       security association that is established as a result of
       authentication for network access is re-used for authentication
       for mobility services.
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       All required information, including IKE credentials, is
       bootstrapped from the following parameter:
 
       *  Network access credentials(*)
 
    (*) A pair of an NAI and a pre-shared secret is an example of a set
    of credentials.  A pair of an NAI and a public key, which may be
    provided as a digital certificate, is another example of a set of
    credentials.
 
 9.  Security Considerations
 
    There are two aspects of security for the Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping
    problem:
 
    1.  The security requirements imposed on the outcome of the
        bootstrapping process by RFC 3775 and other RFCs used by Mobile
        IPv6 for security.
 
    2.  The security of the bootstrapping process itself, in the sense of
        threats to the bootstrapping process imposed by active or passive
        attackers.
 
    Note that the two are related; if the bootstrapping process is
    compromised, the level of security required by RFC 3775 may not be
    achieved.
 
    The following two sections discuss these issues.
 
 9.1.  Security Requirements of Mobile IPv6
 
    The Mobile IPv6 specification in RFC 3775 requires the establishment
    of a collection of IPsec SAs between the home agent and mobile node
    to secure the signaling traffic for Mobile IP, and, optionally, also
    to secure data traffic.  The security of an IPsec SA required by the
    relevant IPsec RFCs must be quite strong.  Provisioning of keys and
    other cryptographic material during the establishment of the SA
    through bootstrapping must be done in a manner such that authenticity
    is proved and confidentiality is ensured.  In addition, the
    generation of any keying material or other cryptographic material for
    the SA must be done in a way such that the probability of compromise
    after the SA is in place is minimized.  The best way to minimize the
    probability of such a compromise is to have the cryptographic
    material only known or calculable by the two end nodes that share the
    SA -- in this case, the home agent and mobile node.  If other parties
    are involved in establishing the SA (through key distribution, for
    example) the process should follow the constraints designed to
    provide equivalent security.
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    RFC 3775 also requires a trust relationship, as defined in Section
    1.3, between the mobile node and its home agent(s).  This is
    necessary, for instance, to ensure that fraudulent mobile nodes that
    attempt to flood other mobile nodes with traffic be not only shut off
    but tracked down.  An infrastructureless relationship as defined in
    Section 1.3 does not satisfy this requirement.  Any bootstrapping
    solution must include a trust relationship between mobile node and
    mobility service provider.  Solutions that depend on an
    infrastructureless relationship are out of scope for bootstrapping.
 
    Another requirement is that a home address be authorized to one
    specific host at a time.  RFC 3775 requires this so that misbehaving
    mobile nodes can be shut down.  This implies that, in addition to the
    IPsec SA, the home agent must somehow authorize the mobile node for a
    home address.  The authorization can be either implicit (for example,
    as a side effect of the authentication for mobility service) or
    explicit.  The authorization can either be done at the time the SA is
    created or be dynamically managed through a first come, first served
    allocation policy.
 
 9.2.  Threats to the Bootstrapping Process
 
    Various attacks are possible on the bootstrapping process itself.
    These attacks can compromise the process such that the RFC 3775
    requirements for Mobile IP security are not met, or they can serve
    simply to disrupt the process such that bootstrapping cannot be
    completed.  Here are some possible attacks:
 
    o  An attacking network entity purporting to offer the mobile node a
       legitimate home agent address or bootstrapping for the IPsec SAs
       may instead offer a bogus home agent address or configure bogus
       SAs that allow the home agent to steal the mobile node’s traffic
       or otherwise disrupt the mobile node’s mobility service.
 
    o  An attacking mobile node may attempt to steal mobility service by
       offering up fake credentials to a bootstrapping network entity or
       otherwise disrupting the home agent’s ability to offer mobility
       service.
 
    o  A man in the middle on the link between the mobile node and the
       bootstrapping network entity could steal credentials or other
       sensitive information and use that to steal mobility service or
       deny it to the legitimate owner of the credentials.  Refer to
       Section 7.15 in [RFC3748] and [AAA-EAP-LLA] for further
       information.
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    o  An attacker could arrange for a distributed denial-of-service
       attack on the bootstrapping entity, to disrupt legitimate users
       from bootstrapping.
 
    In addition to these attacks, there are other considerations that are
    important in achieving a good security design.  As mobility and
    network access authentication are separate services, keys generated
    for these services need to be cryptographically separate, to be
    separately named, and to have separate lifetimes.  This needs to be
    achieved even though the keys are generated from the same
    authentication credentials.  This is necessary because a mobile node
    must be able to move from one serving (or roaming) network access
    provider to another without needing to change its mobility access
    provider.  Finally, basic cryptographic processes must provide for
    multiple algorithms in order to accommodate the widely varying
    deployment needs; the need for replacement of algorithms when attacks
    become possible must also be considered in the design.
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